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　 The aim of this short essay is to introduce briefly recent interpretations 
regarding reasons why the Harry S. Truman administration dropped the atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the beginning of August in 1945.  The 
present author will focus on arguments advocated mainly among American 
scholars and pick up some of the controversial and significant interpretations from 
his own viewpoint.  Therefore, this is not by any means a comprehensive survey 
dealing with the reasons for the dropping of the atomic bombs.1
　 Harry S. Truman issued a message on the way back to Washington D.C. from 
Potsdam to the American people that the United States had dropped a special 
bomb on Hiroshima on August 6.  He informed them of the bomb which “had 
more power than 20,000 tons of TNT,” and continued that “the Japanese began the 
war from the air at Pearl Harbor.  They have been repaid many fold.” 
Subsequently, he confessed that the special bomb was “an atomic bomb.”  Truman 
added that “it was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the 
ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam.  Their leaders promptly rejected that 
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July 11, 2015, at Nanzan University, Nagoya.
 1. In preparing for this essay, the present author has relied heavily on the following articles 
and parts of books dealing with the historiographical debates on the dropping of the atomic 
bombs. J. Samuel Walker, “History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the 
Bomb,”Diplomatic History, 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 319―328; J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and 
Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan ([orig. 1997], Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); J. Samuel Walker, “Recent Literature on 
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ultimatum.  If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin 
from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.” 2  Consequently, 
the atomic bomb was dropped.
　 However, the leaders of the Japanese government did not accept the Potsdam 
Declaration even after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.  While they 
were deliberating whether they would accept unconditional surrender to the Allied 
Powers, the Soviet Union, despite having concluded a neutrality treaty with Japan 
in 1941, declared war on Japan right after the dropping of the atomic bomb.  She 
had already informed the Japanese government of the abolishment of the treaty a 
few months ago.  Nevertheless, the leaders looked on the Soviet Union as an 
arbitrator between Japan and the Allied Powers.  Joseph Stalin participated in the 
war against Japan on August 7 in order to keep the prizes of war which had been 
guaranteed in the Yalta Agreement in exchange for her participation in the war. 
He wanted to take part in the war before Japan would surrender as result of the 
atomic bomb.
　 With the Soviet invasion into Manchuria, the Japanese elite leaders once again 
gathered to deliberate their response to the Potsdam Declaration.  In the midst of 
their deliberations on August 9, the news broke that the second atomic bomb had 
been dropped on Nagasaki.  Subsequently, the emperor intervened in the 
conference to urge the leaders to decide to surrender to the Allied Powers.  The 
news was a shock to the Japanese leaders.  Finally, on August 10, the Japanese 
government accepted the above declaration “with the understanding that the said 
Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogative of 
His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.” 3  On the same day, Truman ordered the 
American military not to drop more atomic bombs without his clear approval.  At 
the end of August in 1945, General Douglas MacArthur flew into Tokyo to take 
over the Japanese government, and on September 2, the representatives of the 
Japanese government signed the papers of surrender on the USS Missouri, and 
World War II was over.
　 In the United States, the response to the news regarding the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was overwhelming.  Eighty-five 
percent of the American people in the Gallop public opinion polls at the end of 
August in 1945 supported the government’s decision to drop the atomic bombs. 
However, some pacifist groups, scientists of atomic energy, and religious groups 
began to criticize the U.S. government for the indiscriminate slaughter of non-
 2. Eben A. Ayers, “Press release by the White House, August 6, 1945,” Truman Library, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/ (accessed August 21, 
2015).
 3. Bureau of Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Records of Negotiations 
Related to the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration,” National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.
go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/010shoshi.html (accessed August 21, 2015).
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combatants by the atomic bombs.  They also blamed the government for not 
warning the Japanese clearly prior to the bombing.4  Besides, in July of 1946, 
taking into consideration various testimonies obtained from Japanese civil as well 
as military leaders, the final report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
concluded as followed: “Based on detailed investigation of all the facts, and 
supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the 
Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability 
prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic 
bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if 
no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” 5  In addition, journalist John 
Hersey wrote a series of articles dealing with the disastrous realities of six local 
victims of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima in the New Yorker in August 1946. 
Subsequently, his series of essays was published in a book form.6  His reportage 
had a strong influence on the American people in general, and there arose doubts 
concerning the wisdom of government’s dropping the atomic bombs in the final 
days before Japanese capitulation.
　 Under these circumstances, James B. Conant, president of Harvard University 
and one of the advocates of producing the atomic bomb during the war, found it 
necessary to take measures to respond to the criticism.  He persuaded Henry L. 
Stimson, the former Secretary of War in charge of the development of the atomic 
bomb, to write an essay dealing with the government’s decision to use the atomic 
bombs, in order to suppress criticism against the government.7  The article 
included reasons why the government justifiably decided to drop the atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The high government officials regarded the 
atomic bomb as “a new and tremendously powerful explosive, as legitimate as any 
other of the deadly explosive weapons of modern war.”  The Japanese government 
“might determine resistance to the end,” with “an armed force of five million men 
and five thousand suicide aircraft.”  To fight against such Japanese combatants, in 
addition to the sea blockade of the homeland and intensified strategic air 
bombardments on cities, the American forces planned the invasions of the 
southern island of Kyushu and the main island of Honshu.  Such operations 
“might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone.”
　 In the meantime, the Interim Committee organized under the direction of 
 4. J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs 
against Japan ([orig. 1997], Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 98―
99.
 5. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War), Penn 
Libraries, http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=United%20
States%20Strategic%20Bombing%20 Survey (accessed August 21, 2015).
 6. John Hersey, Hiroshima ([orig. 1946], New York: Bantam Books, 1986).
 7. J. Samuel Walker, “History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb,” 
Diplomatic History, 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 320.
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Truman made the following recommendations to the president concerning the 
possible atomic bomb.  “(1) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as 
possible.  (2) It should be used on a dual target plant surrounding by or adjacent to 
houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and (3) It should be used 
without prior warning [of the nature of the weapon].”  These conclusions were 
based on the assumption that the Japanese “must be administered a tremendous 
shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire.” 
The Japanese were given the last chance to surrender in the Potsdam ultimatum of 
July 26 in which the Allied powers pledged to bring prompt and utter destruction 
to Japan in case of its continuation of military resistance.  The Japanese ruling 
oligarchy rejected the ultimatum, and the atomic bombs were dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki which “were active working parts of the Japanese war 
effort” on August 6 and on August 9 respectively.  Henry L. Stimson concluded 
that all the evidence he discussed in the article indicated that “the controlling 
factor in the final Japanese decision to accept our terms of surrender was the 
atomic bomb.”  He added that “this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our 
least abhorrent choice,” which stopped “the fire raids, and the strangling 
blockade” and “the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies.” 8
　 What Henry L. Stimson insisted in the article was that the atomic bombs had 
accomplished the objective of ending the war with Japan as soon as possible with 
the fewest victims of American soldiers.  Historian J. Samuel Walker maintained 
that “more than any other single publication, Stimson’s article influenced popular 
views about Truman’s decision to use the bomb.  The information it provided and 
the respect that its author commanded made its arguments seem unassailable.” 
Consequently, it received wide circulation and acclaim among the American 
public.  “The most vivid of the article’s arguments was that the use of the bomb 
prevented over 1 million American casualties by making an invasion 
unnecessary.”  According to Walker, the source of Stimson’s figure was not clear, 
but after the publication of the paper the number of the victims “became indelibly 
etched into the mythology of the decision to use the bomb.” 9  His interpretation 
has become the official stance on the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan and 
has since been regarded as the orthodox thesis.  Also, his interpretation has turned 
out to be a major target for critics of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan.
　 In the 1960s, new-left historians who emerged against the background of the 
anti-Vietnam war movement, questioned the U.S. government’s “imperial” foreign 
policies in pursuit of the expansion of its economic, political and military interests. 
 8. Henry L. Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Harper’s Magazine 
(February 1947): 97―107.
 9. J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs 
against Japan ([orig. 1997], Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 102―
103.
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In the field of recent American foreign policy, for example, they made efforts to 
trace the origins of the cold war in which the Soviet Union has been 
conventionally blamed for its aggressive policies toward East European countries. 
The scholars criticized the U.S. government for the so-called Open-Door 
imperialism in the area where the Soviet Union had dominated.  Consequently, the 
expansive economic policy caused conflicts with the communist powers, which 
meant the beginning of the cold war.
　 In the context of such a critical tendency in the academia, political scientist Gar 
Alperovitz published a book entitled Atomic Diplomacy in 1965, and challenged 
the traditional interpretation of the atomic bombing dropping which has been 
accepted since Stimson’s article was released in 1947.  Based on diaries and 
private papers of Truman, Stimson, and other high officials in the government, 
Alperovitz insisted that the United States dropped the bombs with a diplomatic 
purpose against the Soviet Union rather than for the military victory over Japan. 
The Truman administration knew that Japan had been prepared to surrender if it 
was allowed to keep the emperor system intact.  Nevertheless, the United States 
ignored such Japanese last-minute attempts to finish the war, and chose to threaten 
the Soviet Union in order to win concessions in diplomatic negotiations and to 
check the communist expansion in Eastern Europe by showing off the explosion 
of the atomic bombs.10
　 On the other hand, historian Martin J. Sherwin accepted the idea that anti-
Soviet attitudes existed in the decision to use the atomic bombs, but he insisted 
that this was only a secondary cause for the bomb.  The primary motivation 
behind the bomb was to end the war as quickly as possible with the fewest 
victims, according to Sherwin.11  Historian Barton J.  Bernstein also included 
Alperovitz’s interpretation when he mentioned the reasons for Truman’s decision. 
According to Bernstein, Truman believed that “the bomb could help end the war 
on American terms, possibly avoid the dreaded invasions, punish the Japanese for 
Pearl Harbor and their mistreatment of POWs, fulfill bureaucratic needs, conform 
to the desires of the American people, and also intimidate the Soviets, perhaps 
making them tractable in Eastern Europe.”  [italics in the original]12
　  Historian Michael Kort maintained that although such revisionist 
interpretations spread among historians through the 1980s and the 1990s, because 
of the availability of new documents in Japan and in Russia as well as in the 
 10. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; The Use of the Atomic 
Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Union (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1965).
 11. Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New 
York: Knopf, 1975).
 12. Barton J. Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: 
Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory,” Diplomatic 
History, 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 229.
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United States, the historiographical ground began to change in recent years.13 
Based on these recent studies, he pointed out ten “key questions” concerning the 
subject.14  It goes without saying that these questions are entwined with each other. 
The present author would like to introduce major issues related to the dropping of 
the atomic bombs on Japan.
　 One of the main reasons why revisionist historians criticized the dropping of 
the atomic bombs is based on the assumption that Japan had been ready to 
surrender before the atomic bomb was actually used against Hiroshima, let alone 
against Nagasaki.  They relied on the aforementioned USSBS conclusion that 
Japan would have surrendered without atomic bombs, Soviet entry into the war 
against Japan, and the scheduled invasion of the homeland.  However, historian 
Robert P. Newman investigated the USSBS files thoroughly, and revealed the 
majority of Japanese leaders who had cooperated with the inquiry team denied the 
idea of the “early surrender hypothesis” and believed that the war would have 
lasted beyond November 1 of 1945 because the army would not admit Japan’s 
defeat.  He quoted Konoye Fumimaro, former prime minister and close aide to the 
emperor, as saying that “the really big thing was to overcome the army,” meaning 
that the army had been the strongest resistant group against the surrender. 
Denying the conclusion of the survey report, Newman concluded that the USSBS 
had “no time for thoughtful investigations familiar with Japanese history to 
formulate really probing questions, nor to assimilate what was learned in early 
interviews and use it to sharpen later ones.”  Newman is very critical of the 
historians who paid little attention to the quality of the analysis drawn from the 
survey report.15
　 Here is another example.  Barton J. Bernstein maintained that “the survey’s 
conclusions were undercut by crucial evidence that the survey basically ignored,” 
and quoted Suzuki Kantaro, the Japanese last prime minister during the war, as 
testifying after the war that “the Supreme War Council had proceeded with the 
one plan of fighting a decisive battle at the landing point and was making every 
possible preparation to meet such a landing.  They proceeded with that plan until 
the atomic bomb was dropped.”  Former foreign minister Togo Shigenori also 
informed American questioners of the survey team that “the bomb made a 
powerful difference,” and “propelled the emperor to push more ardently for 
peace” in his recollection of events.16  Moreover, military historian Gian P. Gentile 
 13. Michael Kort, The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 11.
 14. Ibid., 81―116. Refer especially page 82.
 15. Robert P. Newman, “Ending the War with Japan: Paul Nitze’s ‘Early Surrender’ 
Counterfactual,” Pacific Historical Review, 64, no. 2 (May 1995): 167―194. Refer especially 
page 189.
 16. The testimonies are quoted in Barton J. Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb 
and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern 
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also examined the United States strategic bombing survey of Germany and Japan, 
and insisted that the latter’s conclusions were influenced by “increasing Cold War 
tensions” and a dominant member of the team Paul Nitze’s “pre-Hiroshima 
predictions” that “even without atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a 
matter of months.”  And he added that it was necessary for historians to use the 
survey critically “in their attempt to better understand a crucial period of the 
past.” 17
　 The conclusion of the survey team that Japan would have capitulated without 
dropping the atomic bombs, Soviet entry and the scheduled homeland invasion 
operations served as primary evidence to support the revisionist argument, and 
therefore, the afore-mentioned analyses distinctly undermined their basis in a 
profound way.  It seems to me that their analyses suggest the importance of a 
critical approach to the treatment of historical data and documents.
　 Besides, revisionist historians insisted that the U.S. government had known 
through intercepted correspondences between foreign minister Togo Shigenori and 
ambassador Sato Naotake in Moscow that Japan had been planning to terminate 
the war by way of Soviet intermediaries.  On the basis of their communications, 
revisionists claimed that the United States had not needed to drop the atomic 
bombs in order to secure capitulation from the Japanese government.
　 However, historian Robert Maddox, for instance, denied the revisionists’ claim 
that the Togo cable of July 12, 1945 was a clear indication that the emperor had 
determined to surrender.  He mentioned that John Weckering, who had prepared 
for transmittal of the MAGIC intercepts, judged that the Japanese war leaders 
were “making a coordinated effort to stave off defeat through Russian intervention 
and an appeal to war weariness in the United States.”  Consequently, Maddox 
observed that there was “no evidence that the Japanese were prepared to surrender 
on anything resembling the terms even the most lenient American policy could 
make.” 18  Here is another example which refuted the revisionist interpretation. 
On July 21, Togo responded to the ambassador in Moscow that “with regard to 
unconditional surrender...we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances 
whatsoever.  Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much 
more bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in 
accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional 
Memory,” Diplomatic History, 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 251―252.
 17. Gian P. Gentile, “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey of Germany and Japan,” Pacific Historical Review, 66, no. 1 (February 1997): 53―58, 
79; Robert P. Newman, “Ending the War with Japan: Paul Nitze’s ‘Early Surrender’ 
Counterfactual,” Pacific Historical Review, 64, no. 2 (May 1995): 167―194.
 18. Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 83―85, 117―125.
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surrender.”  This statement means that even in the last days of the war the 
Japanese top leaders denied unconditional surrender and sought a negotiated 
settlement in order to preserve the emperor system in disregard of civilian victims 
at home.19
　 At the same time, it was known to the United States through intercepted 
ULTRA information that the number of Japanese troops concentrated in Kyushu 
was on the rise.  Historian Edward J. Drea, analyzing the U.S. army’s code-
breaking operation in the southwest Pacific theater, revealed the correspondence 
among the Japanese military forces with respect to their future military operations 
to defend the homeland against the prospective invasion of enemy troops.   On the 
basis of his findings in intercepted ULTRA reports, Drea made it clear that the 
massive buildup of Japanese forces in Kyushu had been carried out in anticipation 
of the U.S. invasion.  This information was forwarded to the decision makers in 
Washington.  As a result, the U.S. leaders assumed that the Japanese war leaders 
were determined to fight to the last ditch.20  Another historian Richard B.  Frank 
also quoted an analysis of deliberations in Japan’s inner circle through MAGIC 
intercepts, and maintained that “until the Japanese leaders realized that an invasion 
cannot be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms 
satisfactory to the Allies.”  The pessimistic prospect for the planned invasion was 
shared with the U.S. leaders in Washington, who assumed that the Japanese were 
willing to fight back against the homeland attack.21
　 Edward J. Drea and Richard B. Frank were quite familiar with recently 
declassified documents and succeeded in revealing the debates and 
correspondences among Japanese high-level military and civil officials. 
Consequently, with this reliable evidence they proposed rebuttals against 
revisionist arguments that the Japanese ruling elite was ready to finish the war. 
According to these scholars, the U.S. leaders had been familiar with the latest 
information about Japan’s deployment of troops in Kyushu, and they judged that 
the increase indicated the enemy’s determination to fight to the last even in the 
homeland without capitulation.
　 Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the press conference held after the meeting with 
Winston Churchill in Casablanca in 1943, demanded the unconditional surrender 
of the Axis powers.  Roosevelt’s statement meant that the U.S. government would 
 19. The quotation can be found in Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C., The Most Controversial 
Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 65.
 20. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Code-breaking and the War against Japan, 
1942―1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 202―225.
 21. Frank, Richard B. “Ketsu Go: Japanese Political and Military Strategy in 1945.” In 
Reappraisals of the End of the Pacific War edited by Hasegawa Tsuyoshi (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 81―82.
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not allow the emperor system to continue and Hirohito to remain on the throne 
after the Japanese surrender.  However, Gar Alperovitz insisted that had the United 
States been willing to guarantee the Japanese leaders the retention of the emperor 
system, Japan almost certainly would have surrendered before August 6 when the 
atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.22  It was true that high-ranking civilian 
and military advisors recommended Truman to modify unconditional surrender in 
order to allow the Japanese to retain the emperor system with the hope of Japan’s 
immediate capitulation.  But Secretary of State James Byrnes, who had been 
newly appointed by Truman and had had more influence on him than other 
advisors, opposed any specific reference to the emperor in the Potsdam 
Declaration because of his concern about the critical public opinion against the 
emperor that regarded him as a major war criminal.  Consequently, there was no 
particular mention about the emperor in the ultimatum of July 26 which claimed 
“the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland” without delay.23  Did the policy 
of unconditional surrender prolong the war against Japan?
　 In analyzing the process of war termination in Japan, historian Herbert P. Bix 
pointed out that “it was not so much the Allied policy of unconditional surrender 
that prolonged the Pacific war, as it was the unrealistic and incompetent actions of 
Japan’s highest leaders.”  He mentioned that they had missed some opportunities 
to let the lost war end because they were preoccupied with the fate of the imperial 
house in the case of unconditional surrender.  Bix mentioned some missed 
opportunities for the Japanese leaders to end the war before the atomic bombs 
were dropped.  The first occasion was during February in 1945, “when Prince 
Konoe made his report and military intelligence officers alerted them to the 
likelihood of the Soviet Union entering the war against Japan by mid-summer.” 
The second opportunity emerged in the wake of the defeat at Okinawa and 
Germany unconditional surrender in May.  And the last opportunities were lost 
when the Suzuki cabinet rejected the Potsdam Declaration and when they wasted 
the interval between the release of the declaration and the dropping of the bomb.24
　 In addition, J. Samuel Walker revealed that traditionalist scholars have made it 
clear that in the final stage of the war the Japanese government was “too divided 
and too indecisive to accept” the proclamation to end the war.  Historian Robert P. 
Newman examined the unconditional surrender policy from the U.S. and Japanese 
viewpoints.  In his book, he clarified that there were severe controversies between 
 22. Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996), 34.
 23. Michael Kort, The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 95; “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Potsdam Declaration,” 
National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (accessed August 31, 
2015).
 24. Herbert P. Bix, “Japan’s Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation,” Diplomatic History, 
19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 223―224.
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the pacifist group and the belligerent group in the Supreme War Council as to how 
they interpreted the phrases used in the ultimatum declaration.25  It was difficult to 
assume that the Japanese ruling elite would reach a consensus about the decision 
to capitulate.
　 Moreover, Asada Sadao of Doshisha University examined the decision-making 
process of the Japanese high-ranking leaders including the emperor that led the 
country into surrender.  In so doing, he clarified that the prime minister overcame 
the deadlock of the Supreme War Council by way of “sacred decision” in 
cooperation with the emperor, which was quite an unprecedented political act in 
Japan.  In June the emperor had hoped that the war would end soon.  Asada also 
indicated that there was “no missed opportunity for an earlier peace” judging from 
intransigence of the military leaders.  They demanded more lenient surrender 
conditions “even after the two atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war.” 
[italics in the original] In addition, Asada maintained that they regarded the atomic 
bomb as “a golden opportunity given by Heaven for Japan to end the war” and as 
“a means for the military to save face.”  Since the war ended as a result of the 
atomic bombs, they never found it necessary to take responsibility for leading the 
country into the war and for causing devastating hardships to the people 
involved.26  Using Japanese primary sources, Asada was very critical of the hard-
core militarists who were not to take responsibility for the slow decision-making.
　 In the meantime, Robert J. Maddox, for instance, quoted Army Chief of Staff 
George C. Marshall as concluding after examining the intercepted cable among 
the Japanese high officials that they were still making efforts to use the Soviet 
Union as the mediator and to reach a negotiated peace.  Truman also determined 
that the Japanese peace feelers and the proposed Konoe’s mission to Moscow 
were their gesture to protract the war in order to gain better terms for ending the 
war.  It was disclosed that even Joseph Grew, who was highly estimated by 
revisionist historians due to his claim for mitigating the demand for unconditional 
surrender, acknowledged that the top Japanese leaders sought Soviet assistance 
and war weariness in America to avoid its defeat.27
　 Once again, on the basis of recent literature of the subject, it is fair to 
summarize that the Japanese ruling elite was not able to come up with the 
consensual agreement among themselves, and had overlooked opportunities to 
 25. Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1995), 57―78.
 26. Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A 
Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review, 67, no. 4 (November 1998): 477―512, Refer 
especially pages 485―488, 501.
 27. Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2004), 83―85; J. Samuel Walker, “Recent Literature on Truman’s 
Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,” Diplomatic History, 29, no. 2 (April 
2005): 316―317.
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end the war.  It seems to me intriguing to know more about their debates in terms 
of their war responsibility.
　 As the present author mentioned in the prior paragraph, Henry L. Stimson 
maintained in the famous article that the dropping of the atomic bombs had saved 
more than one million American soldiers without any pre-meditated invasion of 
the homeland.  This figure has been accepted among the American people since it 
was published in 1947.  In the middle of the 1990s, however, as the so-called 
Enola Gay controversy broke out, this figure became once more the point at issue 
in terms of justification of the dropping of the atomic bombs.  For instance, Barton 
Bernstein maintained that “there is solid evidence.....that military planners before 
Hiroshima had placed the number at 46,000 and sometimes as low as about 20,000 
American lives.”  He regarded the higher numbers of American casualties as 
exaggerations in order for Truman and his advisors to justify their decision to use 
the atomic bombs and to save lives of American soldiers.  “When Truman 
approved the order of July 24 to use atomic bombs, he had never received a high-
level report suggesting half a million or even a quarter million U.S. dead.” 28
　 However, military historian D. M. Giangreco, based on declassified military-
related documents, revealed how casualty projections for the invasion of Japan 
were figured out by U.S. war leaders.  According to his explanation, the Joint 
Planning Staff adopted the “Saipan ratio” in predicting the figure of victims in 
military operations.  This was resulted in the combat in Saipan where 
“approximately one American killed and several wounded were needed to 
exterminate several Japanese soldiers.”  This formula provided “the basis for the 
Army and War Department manpower policy for 1945.”  Giangreco made it clear 
that “the statistical possibility of a million casualties, combined with the 
experience of combat attrition of line infantry units in both Europe and the Pacific, 
had already prompted the Army and War Department manpower policy for 1945, 
and thus, the pace for the big jump in Selective Service inductions and expansion 
of the training base in the U.S.” 29  Moreover, Giangreco mentioned in another 
article that Truman had read a memo sent from the former president Herbert 
Hoover predicting that “the cost to America from an invasion of Japan could run 
from 500,000 to 1,000,000 lives.”  And Truman, who was monitoring the rising 
casualty figures from Okinawa, was very much worried about the creation of 
“another Okinawa” in the discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the 
Kyushu operation.  This meant that Truman’s prediction of the “magnitude of the 
 28. Bernstein, “A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
(June-July, 1986): 38, 42.
 29. D. M. Giangreco, “Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945―1946: 
Planning and Policy Implications,” The Journal of Military History, 61, no. 3 (July 1997): 
521―581. Refer especially pages 535, 580―581.
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fighting” was very high.  Stimson sent a memo to the president informing him that 
“we shall in my opinion have to go through with an even more bitter finish fight 
than in Germany.  We shall incur the losses incident to such a war and we shall 
have to leave the Japanese islands ever more thoroughly destroyed than was the 
case with Germany.”  The high-ranking officials shared the common 
understanding that the invasion of Japan indicated “an even more bitter finish 
fight than Germany” which “had cost roughly a million American all-causes 
casualties to defeat the Nazis.”  Thus, Giangreco proved that the figure of the 
casualty estimates in the case of the invasion of Japanese homeland was much 
higher than Barton J. Bernstein had maintained.30
　 Giangreco’s contention of the high figure of estimated casualties was based on 
the method that the American military leaders exercised, and Truman and other 
advisers understood a dire prospect for the invasion of the homeland.  This is a 
result of the remarkable development of the combination of diplomatic history and 
military history.  It requires historians to have expert and technical knowledge 
about the subject in order to judge the value of his interpretation.31
　 In the final days before Japan’s surrender, two atomic bombs were dropped on 
August 6 and 9, and in the interval of the two bombs the Soviet Union declared 
war on Japan against the latter’s wish for the role of a mediator with the Allied 
powers.  There have been controversies among scholars as to which impact was 
perceived more important than the other one on the part of the Japanese leaders. 
In the 1990s, it seems fair to say that the traditional school of scholars tended to 
emphasize more the impact of the atomic bombing in the Japanese decision-
making process.  For instance, Robert J. Maddox, quoting statements of high 
officials including the emperor, maintained that “the use of the atomic bomb had 
materially hastened V-J Day.”  Historian Asada Sadao insisted that the emperor, 
who had decided to conclude the war in June 1945 at the time of the battle of 
Okinawa, informed Kido Koichi, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, that he would 
finish the war immediately right after the Hiroshima bomb.  In addition, Asada 
asserted that the premier Suzuki Kantaro made up his mind to end the war “before 
he was informed of the Soviet entry into the war on the following day.”  [emphasis 
by Asada] Additionally, in his book dealing with the last days of the Japanese 
empire, Richard B. Frank concluded that despite his admitting the significance of 
 30. D. M. Giangreco, “‘A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas’: President Truman 
and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan,” Pacific Historical Review, 72, no. 1 
(February 2003): 93―132. Refer especially pages 110―111, 125―129.
 31. D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945―
1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), xiii―xx. Giangreco pointed out that historians 
made mistakes in the way “how the estimates were made and exactly what they represented.” 
xvii.
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the Soviet intervention “the atomic bomb played the more critical role because it 
undermined the fundamental premise that the United States would have to invade 
Japan to secure a decision.” 32
　 Some scholars, however, insisted that the Soviet entry into the war had more 
impact on the Japanese ruling elite than the dropping of the atomic bombing.  The 
main advocate of this scholarly group is Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, a professor at the 
University of California at Santa Barbara.  Hasegawa asserted that “the Soviet 
invasion had a more important effect on Japan’s decision to surrender.”  At the 
same time, he regarded the emperor’s “sacred decision” as the most important 
immediate cause for the capitulation which was motivated by “a sense of personal 
survival and deep responsibility to maintain the imperial house.”  Hasegawa’s 
insistence was totally based on close analysis of testimonies of Japanese war 
leaders including the emperor which refuted aforementioned interpretations 
presented by Frank and Asada.  For instance, examining Deputy Chief of Staff 
Kawabe’s diaries, Hasegawa drew the conclusion that “there is no question but 
that the news of the Soviet attack gave him a much bigger shock than the news of 
the atomic bomb.”  Hasegawa also quoted the imperial rescript on August 17 for 
the Japanese troops and revealed that the emperor was afraid of “incur[ring] even 
more damage to ourselves” and “endangering the very foundation of the empire’s 
existence” i.e. “our glorious kokutai” as a result of the Soviet entry into the war. 
[italic in the original]33
　 As for the contentious issue discussed in the previous paragraph, historian 
Michael D. Gordin approached from America’s standpoint.  According to Gordin, 
the American decision-makers came to adopt the “shock strategy” in order to get 
Japan to accept unconditional surrender.  The United States found it necessary to 
give a tremendous shock to the Japanese ruling elite to comply with total 
capitulation within one year after Germany surrender.  In this context, it was the 
atomic bomb that was available for the United States in carrying out the “shock 
strategy” most effectively.  Besides, by the summer of 1945, strategic bombing 
had also turned out to be America’s air raid operations by B―29s from Tinian 
Island.  The U.S. leaders additionally considered the Soviet entry into the war as 
another shock to the Japanese ruling oligarchy which had attempted to use the 
 32. Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2004), 150―151; Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb 
and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review, 67, no. 4 
(November 1998): 487―489; Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese 
Empire ([orig. 1999], New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 346―348.
 33. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, “The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: Which Was More 
Important in Japan’s Decision to Surrender?” In The End of the Pacific War, edited by 
Hasegawa, 113―144. Refer especially 126―129, 134―136, 139. His contention is unfolded in 
his previous monograph: Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, The Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the 
Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).
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country as a reliable mediator.  Thus, both the dropping of the atomic bomb and 
the participation of the Soviet Union in the war contributed eventually to 
America’s shock strategy, which finally forced the high-level Japanese leaders to 
accept unconditional surrender.34
　 It is hard to decide which element, the atomic bombs or Soviet entry into the 
war, had a more serious impact on the Japanese oligarchy in their final judgment. 
In dealing with a question like this, analyzing Japanese documents is essential to 
make the case.  It seems to me that Hasegawa’s scrutiny is more stimulating 
because he tried to investigate the emperor’s motivation behind his “sacred 
decision.”  No one will be able to know about it, but historical research will be 
continued.
　 Here is another topic which has been neglected by scholars among important 
topics concerning the atomic bomb, i.e. to what extent American decision-makers 
understood radiation effects on human beings before the decision to drop the 
atomic bomb.  Historian Michael Kort summarized the previous state of studies of 
the subject as following: “the full impact of its destructive power, especially the 
extent to which radiation would kill long after the explosion, was not fully 
understood.” 35  Historian Sean L. Malloy, especially investigating documents 
restored in the Nuclear Testing Archive in Nevada, disclosed that “human and 
animal studies conducted by scientists and physicians attached to the Manhattan 
Project during the war generated a great deal of information about the biological 
effects of nuclear radiation.”  Why did this crucial evidence not attract the 
attention of the decision-makers in deciding to drop the atomic bomb?  Malloy 
pointed out that General Leslie R. Groves in charge of the project had insisted on 
a “policy of compartmentalization that strictly limited communication between 
scientists working at the many various Manhattan Project facilities” in the hope to 
complete the atomic bomb without giving thought on potential after effects of 
radiation.  The members of the Interim Committee were not informed of “lingering 
and delayed effects on the survivors” of the bomb’s initial radiation. 
Consequently, though the “immediate and long-term biological effects on victims 
of the bomb” were predictable, high-level officials such as Truman, Stimson, and 
Byrnes who involved themselves in the critical decision had little knowledge 
about the issue even while they were at the Potsdam Conference.  Malloy also 
submitted a counterfactual question: if Truman and his advisers had known about 
radiation and its aftereffects, “might they have handled the bomb differently?” 
His answer was that there was a possibility that they might make a different 
 34. Michael D. Gordin, Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), chap. 2.
 35. Michael Kort, The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), xv.
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choice about how the bomb was used.36
　 The question about to what extent the American decision-makers had accurate 
knowledge about radiation is important especially in appraising the moral aspect 
of using the atomic bomb.  The present author finds it very important to gain more 
information about this subject with further investigation.
　 In addition to the conventional controversial aspects of the atomic bombings, 
there emerged a new approach to the issue of Truman’s decision in the 1990s. 
Historian Ronald Takaki attempted to explain Truman’s decision to drop the 
atomic bomb in terms of his sense of masculinity.  Since Truman had been 
ridiculed as a sissy in his childhood, he disguised himself as a manly character in 
his behavior.  Besides, inheriting the legacy of frontier life where power had been 
bragged about and highly respected, Truman determined to prove himself a 
resolute and in-charge executive, taking full responsibility for his post.  Reflecting 
this attitude toward issues in international politics from a masculine perspective, 
Truman ordered the use of the atomic bomb, which he thought was a symbol of 
manliness.37
　 Ronald Takaki did not explain the academic theories behind the so-called 
psychohistorical perspective, Young-Gun Ko and Jin-Young Kim, scholars of 
psychohistory, aimed to “identify the relationship between the childhood 
experiences of Truman and his historical decision to drop the atomic bomb.”  The 
theory behind this approach is based on psychoanalyst Eric H. Erick’s book 
entitled Life History and the Historical Moment published in 1975.  They pointed 
out that Truman’s “vulnerable masculinity” which “originated in the relationship 
with his dominant mother” had existed under his decision to drop the bombs.  “As 
a symbol of almighty power or absolute masculinity, the atomic bomb might 
appear to Truman with femiphobia as an oracle that could cure his inferiority 
feelings.”  Moreover, the scholars emphasized that “in Truman’s psychological 
world the Japanese female, children and old people [who lived in Hiroshima] are 
associated with his bad self which he unconsciously wished to eradicate.”  In the 
final analysis, it seems to them that his life illustrated a typical example of the 
politician who “trie[d] to deal with femiphobia through reaction formation.” 38
　 There were some presidents of the United States who were seriously examined 
from the psychohistorical perspective.  It is hard to judge whether there was 
 36. Sean L. Malloy, “‘A Very Pleasant Way to Die’: Radiation Effects and the Decision to 
Use the Atomic Bomb against Japan,” Diplomatic History, 36, no. 3 (June 2012): 515―545.
 37. Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Company, 1995), 109―120.
 38. Young-Gun Ko and Jin-Young Kim, “A Psychohistory of Truman’s Decision to Drop 
the Atomic Bomb,” The Journal of Psychohistory, 34, no. 3 (Winter 2007): 222―240. Refer 
especially pages 222, 226―227, 235―236.
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certain relationship between upbringing in childhood and behavior in adulthood. 
Especially when the person in question was a president that possessed strong 
power, it will be necessary for him to take other elements into consideration 
whenever he had to make final decisions.  Nevertheless, this perspective will 
enrich our understanding of his decision and actions.
　 In the final analysis, the author would like to comment about the present state 
of the historiography of the subject which he has introduced thus far in the paper. 
It is a remarkable development that a number of new studies have emerged in the 
past twenty years as governmental, military and private documents started to be 
declassified in the public archives and be available to scholars.  As for the issue of 
casualty estimates in the case of homeland operations, D. M. Giangreco, using the 
declassified documents, clarified how military officers figured out the number of 
war casualties and denied the conventional interpretation which insisted on 
relatively low figures.  Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, examining closely the Japanese 
documents, asserted that the Soviet entry into the war had more impact on the 
Japanese decision-makers than the atomic bombs did.  Herbert P. Bix also made 
clear that the Japanese leaders were responsible for the delayed decision to 
surrender during which the atomic bombs had been used.  The controversy 
concerning individual topics in the use of the atomic bombs may continue among 
scholars, but the author finds it important and recommendable to analyze the 
decision-making process in the inner circle of the Japanese leadership by 
exploring new documents.  Especially, the author is also interested in knowing 
more about how the Japanese ruling leaders tried to end the lost war when the 
people were suffering from devastated daily lives under severe bombardments and 
the atomic bombs.  It is significant to remember that only the Japanese decision-
makers had to determine when and how they accepted unconditional surrender 
despite tremendous attacks from the Allied powers.
　 As a result of the examination of the recent historiogoraphy of the subject, it is 
fair to conclude that Stimson’s explanation of why Truman dropped the atomic 
bombs has been dominant in the community of American scholars.  It is a general 
consensus that the Truman administration dropped the atomic bombs to end the 
war as quickly as possible with the minimum sacrifice of American soldiers.  The 
interpretation that the atomic bombs forced the Japanese leaders to accept 
unconditional surrender is one thing, but the contention that the dropping of the 
atomic bombs was moralistically justifiable is another thing.  It goes without 
saying that there are some studies touching upon moral complexities and 
individual agonies in using the atomic bombs.  The present author, however, has 
not discussed moral responsibility of American decision-makers for using the 
atomic bombs and for opening up Pandora’s box leading to the nuclear race in the 
future generation.  Even after the reasons why the atomic bombs were dropped at 
the end of the war were made clear, historians will continue to question of the 
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wisdom of using them against human beings.
